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The target zone model of Krugman (1991) has failed empirically. In this paper, we develop a 
model of the exchange rate with heterogeneous agents in a free floating and a target zone 
regime. We show that this simple model mimics the empirical puzzles of exchange rates: 
excessive volatility, fat tails, volatility clustering, and disconnection from the fundamentals. 
In addition, the target zone regime replicates a reduced nominal volatility for the same level 
of fundamental volatility as in the free floating regime and the distribution of the exchange 
rate within the band is hump-shaped. 
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1.  Introduction 
The day-to-day behavior of exchange rates remains a perpetual puzzle for both the 
academic community and policy makers. As the recent downward trend of the yen 
appears to be unrelated to the fundamentals, a renewed discussion among policy-makers 
at the G7 meeting in Singapore has emerged about acceptable exchange rate movements. 
This included suggestions to reimpose exchange rate bands among the major currencies. 
Besides, the recent currency crises in emerging markets have lead to a revival of so-called 
managed floats in south-east Asia, while the membership in the EMS II is a prerequisite 
for the introduction of the Euro in accession countries of the European Community 
enlargement process. From a policy-maker’s perspective, a target zone seems to be a 
reasonable measure in order to prevent economies from persistent misalignments, excess 
volatility or even currency crisis. 
In the academic literature, a large body of theoretical work on target zones now 
has emerged starting with Krugman’s (1991) seminal derivation of the honeymoon 
effect.
1 Most of the modifications to the basic target zone model try to account for 
empirical regularities such as hump-shaped distributions or very limited honeymoon 
effects.
2 While stressing the role of imperfect credibility (Bertola and Svensson, 1993, 
Tristani (1994), and Werner, 1995), intramarginal intervention (Lindberg and Söderlind, 
1994, Iannizzotto and Taylor, 1999, and Taylor and Iannizzotto, 2001), or price stickiness 
(Miller and Weller, 1991) the models generally stick to the representative agent/rational 
expectations framework.
3 Within this setting the stabilizing effect of the target zone on 
exchange rates results from tying down the hands of future monetary policy. However, as 
pointed out by Krugman and Miller (1993), the efficient market assumption is 
                                                           
1 For survey, see Svensson (1992) and Garber and Svensson (1995). 
2 Sarno and Taylor (2002) briefly survey the empirical literature on target zones. 
3 The only exemption the authors are aware of is Krugman and Miller (1993) and Corrado et al. (2006). Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  3 
particularly misleading as policy-makers introduced target zone arrangements precisely 
because empirical research convinced them that exchange rates exhibit persistent 
misalignments (Rogoff, 1996) and excess volatility (Flood and Rose, 1995). In order to 
overcome this contradiction Sarno and Taylor (2002) suggest the analysis of target zone 
with the allowance for heterogeneous agents.  
Of course, a growing number of heterogeneous agents models succeeded in 
replicating the above time series properties of exchange rates (Farmer and Joshi 2002, 
Frankel and Froot 1986, Brock and Hommes 1998, Lux and Marchesi 2000). Particularly, 
in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005a,b, 2006) traders switch between fundamental and 
chartistic rules dependent on their past profitability. This creates an exchange rate 
dynamics, which accounts for the exchange rate disconnect from fundamentals. 
According to the chartist-fundamentalist approach, the price process is therefore not only 
driven by exogenous news, but is at least partially due to an endogenous nonlinear law of 
motion.
4 If the interaction of heterogeneous traders can indeed be blamed for the 
observed financial market 'anomalies', then economic policy measures may be beneficial 
by reducing misalignments and excess volatility and should be reconsidered within the 
new framework.  
In this paper, we present a simple behavioral model with chartists and 
fundamentalists where the switching depends on the current misalignment of the 
exchange rate. Our model replicates the empirical stylized facts about exchange rates, 
like excessive volatility, fat tails, volatility clustering and the disconnection of 
fundamental and nominal exchange rate. We then compare the time series properties of 
exchange rates within the regime of free floating and the target zone regime. The latter 
regime significantly reduces exchange rate volatility by reducing speculative activity in 
the FX market. In addition, the exchange rate remains for a considerably long period in 
                                                           
4 Ahrens and Reitz (2005), Reitz and Westerhoff (2003), and Vigfusson (1997) provide some empirical 
evidence. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  4 
the center of the band albeit the fundamental exchange rate does not exhibit mean 
reversion tendencies. The resulting hump-shaped distribution of the exchange rate greatly 
reduces the frequency of central bank intervention. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple chartist-
fundamentalist model. Section 3 presents both analytical and Monte Carlo simulation 
results. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Setup of the model 
 
2.1. Market maker’s pricing behavior 
A sensible starting point of our agent based analysis of exchange rates in target 
zones is the market maker's pricing behavior. As pointed out in LeBaron (2006) asset 
prices depend critically on the broker dealers trading behavior ensuring liquidity and 
continuity of asset markets. Therefore, the primary function of the market maker is to 
mediate transactions out of equilibrium, i.e. to provide market counterpart for excess 
demand that is otherwise not matched (Kyle, 1985; Farmer and Joshi, 2002). Within the 
market microstructure literature it now has become a standard building block to assume 
that the market maker receives random order flow from both informed and uninformed 
traders. Due to this information asymmetry the market maker generally increases the 
exchange rate when confronted with positive excess demand in order to maximize 
expected profits and keeping inventory risks at a low level. Though the optimal price 
setting behavior of the market maker has been derived for a wide range of informational 
and institutional settings (Lyons, 2001) there is currently no contribution dealing with 
market makers' behavior within target zone models. So how would a rational market 
maker behavior look like in a fully credible target zone? To answer this question, it turns 
out to be useful first to start with describing the underlying exchange rate dynamics when 
the target zone has not yet been introduced. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  5 
A risk neutral market maker is supposed to aggregate the orders and to clear all 
trades at a single price (Kyle, 1985). The assumption of risk neutrality implies that the 
market maker utility does not vary with inventory, which is in contrast to the empirical 
observation indicating that FX dealers manage inventory intensively. Moreover, the batch 
clearing of orders does not allow for bid-ask spreads as they arise naturally in sequential 
trade models (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) or, more recently, in simultaneous-trade 
models like Lyons (1997). Since the focus of this paper is on investigating daily (or lower 
frequency) exchange rates before and after the introduction of a target zone, the 
simplifications made here seem to be reasonable. The orders are submitted anonymously 
and come from both informed and uninformed sources. As outlined above, the orders 
from N traders  , are collected by the market maker in an anonymous way, 
so that 
i x (t), i=1,..,N
1 () ()
N
i i x tx
= =∑ t  denotes the excess demand for foreign currency arising from the 
surplus of buy orders over sell orders. Due to this batch clearing process the market 
maker is unable to determine the source of a given order. However, since informed orders 
reflect current or future changes of the exchange rate’s fundamentals, the market maker 
will increase prices when excess demand from traders is positive and vice versa. While 
absorbing traders' excess demand for foreign currency the market maker's speculative 
position changes accordingly. We define the open position p(t) of the market maker by 
the (log of) cumulative order flow from traders at any moment in time so that  . 
In order to keep track of his position the market maker additionally considers the future 
expected changes of the exchange rate when setting today's price of foreign currency: 
p'(t)=x(t)





πγ =+ , 
where s(t) is the log of the current spot price of foreign exchange. From eq.(1) we may 
expect that nominal exchange rates are highly correlated with the cumulative order flow 
from traders, which is supported by empirical evidence (Evans and Lyons, 2002). 
Without loss of generality it will be convenient to represent the current exchange rate in Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  6 
terms of deviations from its initial value,  ( ) 0 s(t) = log S(t)/S , and suggest that the market 
maker had a balanced position when started his business, p( . More important, we 
assume that the market maker perceives changes in his position to be random, so that  
0)=0
(2)  ) t ( dz ) t ( dp σ = . 
Assuming that order flow is driven by the increment of a standard Wiener process 
dz(t) implies a Brownian motion on p(t). As a result, there should be no predictable 
change in the change of the exchange rate, i.e.  [ ] 0 dt / ) t ( ds E = , if the exchange rate is 
allowed to float freely. Based on the hybrid model of Evans and Lyons (2002) we may 
interpret the second term in the exchange rate eq. (1) as the news arrival process 
regarding standard macroeconomic fundamentals. However, fundamentals are poorly 
related to exchange rates (Engel and West, 2005) so that our modeling choice seems to be 
reasonable. As a result positive aggregate excess demand of traders drives the exchange 









which is consistent with the results of market microstructure research. For example, 
Evans and Lyons (2002) show that regressing daily changes of log DM/$ rates on daily 
order flow produces an R
2 statistic greater than 0.6. In general, the parameter π considers 
the exchange rate's elasticity with respect to changes of market maker’s position. It 
measures the extent to which the market maker raises the price of foreign currency when 
confronted with excess demand of traders. However, for analytical convenience we set π 
equal to unity. The price setting behavior of the market maker earns zero expected profits 
preventing potential competitors from entering the market. The unit root behavior of the 
market maker's position implies that the exchange rate contains a unit root either. Note 
                                                           
5 Negative exchange rates caused by negative excess demand of traders are to be interpreted as exchange 
rates below initial value. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  7 
that the empirical literature provides strong evidence for the unit root behavior of short-
run exchange rates (Meese and Rogoff, 1983). Thus, for modeling short-run dynamics of 
foreign exchange rates this seems to be a sensible approximation.  
 
Crucial for our agent based model is the market maker's behavior when monetary 
authorities decided to introduce a target zone that bounds the exchange rate between an 
upper edge s and a lower edge s of the band, whereby the symmetry assumption restricts 
s to be –s. Of course, confronted with an excess demand of traders the market maker 
will increase the exchange rate according to the first term of eq. (1). But due to the target 
zone the expected appreciation of the exchange rate must be lower than the expected 
depreciation so that the expected change of the exchange rate is negative in the aftermath 
of the considered trading activity. The nonzero future expected exchange rate change 
together with the no-entry condition forces the market maker to accept a larger short 
position than in the case of free floating. Taken by the same logic, the given excess 
demand is associated with a lower increase of the exchange rate, which can be interpreted 
as a decrease in π. Clearly, the closer the exchange rate comes to the upper edge of the 
band, the larger is the negative effect on the elasticity. In the limit, when the exchange 
rate reaches s, the market maker will accept any short position in his inventory so that 
the elasticity π has an arbitrarily small value. In case of negative excess demand from 
traders it is straightforward to show that the resulting expected future appreciation of the 
exchange rate led the market maker to accept larger long positions for a given quote than 
in the case of free floating. When the exchange rate approaches the lower bound, every 
excess supply is absorbed by the market maker without any further depreciation.  
Plotted in a diagram we find that the relationship between the market maker’s open 
position and the spot rate exhibit the typical S-shaped curve.  
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Figure 1: Exchange rate target zone 
 
 
12 slope A ρ = +
 
From the extensive literature on target zones started by Krugman (1991) it is well 
known that the analytical form of the S-curve is defined by 
(4)  , where 
() () () ()
pt pt st pt Ae e
ρρ − ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦ ρ  depends on the volatility of the 
fundamentals   and the impact 
2 σ γ  of the future expected changes of the exchange rate 
on the current exchange rate.
6
The integration constant A < 0 is determined by smooth pasting conditions, which 
ensure that the S-curve is tangent to the edges of the target zone:  
(5) 
pp spA e e




− ⎡⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦ , 
                                                           
6 As is standard in this literature, we will assume random walk fundamentals for the standard model in our 
simulations. This assumption does not inflict with the credibility of the target zone regime for a limited 
time horizon. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  9 
where  pdenotes the value of the excess demand at which the exchange rate 
reaches the upper bound s. As is already mentioned in Krugman (1991), the exchange 
rate dynamics in a target zone described by eq. (4) may be derived from option pricing 
theory as well (Dixit, 1989). From this perspective the owner of foreign currency is long 
in a put option that prevents the value of his asset to fall below the strike price s and is 
short in a call option, which ultimately defines the maximum price s of foreign 
exchange. The term   is due to the short position in the call option and is negative 
for all p(t), while   depicts the value of the long position in the put option and is 
positive for all p(t).
) t ( p Ae
ρ
) t ( p Ae
ρ − −
7 Again, the pricing behavior of the market maker is “regret free” in 
the sense that the opportunity cost of selling foreign currency is zero, i.e. holding foreign 
currency by herself instead of going short earns zero expected profits.  
 
2.2. Marginal interventions of the central bank 
The market maker’s price setting behavior, particularly the willingness to long or 
short unlimited positions of foreign currency, is a result of the risk neutrality assumption. 
Existing bank regulations clearly prohibit extensive short or long positions enforcing the 
market maker to pass at least some of the traders’ orders onto the central bank. This 
implies that the current excess demand of traders is partly matched by central bank 
interventions. As a result the market maker’s inventory is the sum of traders’ cumulative 
excess demand and cumulative central bank intervention of opposite sign. Thus, the S-
curve in Figure 1 describing the market maker’s pricing behavior has to be generalized to 
(7)  ( ) ( ) () () () ()
() () ()
CB CB pt p t pt p t CB st pt p t Ae e
ρρ +− + ⎡⎤ =+ + − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
. 
The variable p
CB(t) denotes the cumulative amount of central bank’s foreign 
exchange intervention at time t and can be considered as a shift parameter. When the 
                                                           
7 At the center of the band the values of the options cancel each other out so that s(t) = p(t) = 0. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  10 
central bank is forced by the market maker to sell at the upper bound of the band the 
stock of foreign currency in the hands of private agents increases so that the S-curve is 
shifted to the right. Thus, eq. (7) defines a whole family of S-curves.  
 
2.3 Excess demand of speculators 
In the recent decade a large number of survey studies such as Taylor and Allen 
(1992) and Menkhoff (1998) uniformly confirm that speculators in foreign exchange 
markets generally do not rely on mathematically well-defined econometric or economic 
models, but instead follow simple trading rules, particularly in the short run. We will 
assume that traders define their orders using a trading rule supplied by financial analysts. 
These trading rules, often issuing simple buy or sell signals rather than sophisticated 
measures of the asset's intrinsic value, are generally proposed by two groups of financial 
analysts, so-called chartists and fundamentalists. To compare the different forecasting 
strategies before and after the introduction of the target zone, it is important to mention 
that the predictability of exchange rates is based on the time series properties of the 
underlying order flow.  
Chartists may be defined as traders relying on technical analysis. They believe 
that exchange rate time series exhibit regularities, which can be detected by a wide range 
of technical trading rules (Murphy, 1999). Technical analysis generally suggests buying 
(selling) when prices increase (decrease) so that chartist forecasting is well described by 
extrapolative expectations (Takagi, 1992).  
 
2.3.1 Chartists’ rule in a floating regime 
Of course, due to the one to one relationship between the exchange rate and the 
order flow (eq. 1) the chartist techniques may be applied directly to the exchange rates, 
but its forecasting success is rooted in the time series properties of the order flow. The Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  11 
expected value of the exchange rate at the end of the incremental forecasting horizon 
( ) is a function of the exchange rate and its current change:
f
C s ˆ 8
(8)  .  ) t ( ' s ) t ( s s ˆ C
f
C α + =
Assuming that chartists' excess demand for foreign currency is linear in the 
expected profit, their current order in a floating exchange rate setting is 




C α β β = − = , 
where βC measures influence of expected profits on excess demand for foreign currency. 
2.3.2 Chartists’ rule in a target zone 
In a target zone, however, the exchange rate is constrained to stay within the range 
between s and s, and the its expected change depends nonlinearly on the current level. 
Thus, for any predicted future order flow, the associated expected s'(t) will be 
significantly lower in the target zone regime than it is within free floating. To anticipate 
this target zone effect, chartists calculate   using  ) p ˆ ( s s ˆ C
TZ TZ
C = ) t ( ' p ) t ( p p ˆ C C α + = . For 
the sake of simplicity, we expand the target zone exchange rate equation (4) in a Taylor 
series of degree one   yielding  p ˆ s(p) s(p) s' (p p) ≈+ −   ˆ
(10)  , ) t ( ' p ' s ) t ( s s ˆ C p
TZ
C α ⋅ + =
9
where  . Using the fact that s'(t) =  dp / ds ' s p ≡ ) t ( ' p ' s p⋅  we may formulate a chartist 
forecasting in target zones very similar to the case of flexible exchange rates: 
                                                           
8 The superscript f indicates that the expected value is valid in case of floating. 
9 Note that the first order Taylor expansion is only appropriate for small changes of order flow. For larger 
changes of order flow the change of the option values have to be taken into account. In case of 
extrapolating a deviating exchange rate the associated changes of the option values further reduce the 
forecasted appreciation. However, chartist forecasting is as well applicable for exchange rates approaching 
to the center of the band. In this case, the according changes of the option values tend to increase the 
forecasted exchange rate change. This asymmetry based on second order effects may be represented by a 
time varying coefficient αC and provides additional stabilization of the exchange rate path.  Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  12 
(11)    ) t ( ' s ) t ( s s ˆ TZ C
TZ
C α + =
To compare eq. (11) with eq. (8) it is useful to remember that  in case of 
floating and  =
1 ' s p =
p ' s ( )
) t ( p ) t ( p e e A 1
ρ ρ ρ
− + +  in case of the target zone. Obviously, a given 
order flow generally generates a lower change of the exchange rate in the target zone than 
in case of free floating, which has to be taken into account by chartist traders. The 
magnitude of this effect depends on the derivative  and is investigated in more detail 
using the following Figure 2. 
p ' s
 





In case of a balanced position we know from eq. (4) that the exchange rate is at 
the center of the band. Any excess demand has a maximum impact ( ) on the 
exchange rate. For higher levels of excess demand the S-curve gets flatter implying lower 
values of the first derivative. At the top of the band, when s(t) = 
p s' 1 2 A =+ρ
s , the first derivative 
equals zero and excess demand of traders has no impact on the exchange rate.
10 
                                                           
10 The same argumentation holds for negative open positions. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  13 
Consequently, the potential for extrapolative forecasting diminishes when approaching to 
the edges of the band. In contrast, when the exchange rate tends back to the center of the 
band, the exchange rate change increases steadily implying a rise in speculative 
positions.
11 The excess demand of chartists is 
(12)  ,  () ) t ( ' s ) t ( s s ˆ ) t ( x TZ C C C C
TZ
C α β β = − =
which is as well hump-shaped with respect to the current value of the exchange rate. 
2.3.3 Fundamentalists‘ rule in a floating regime 
In contrast to the extrapolative expectations of chartists, fundamentalists have in 
mind some kind of long-run equilibrium exchange rate to which the actual exchange rate 
reverts with a given speed over time. In empirical contributions to the exchange rate 
literature the long-run equilibrium value is repeatedly described by purchasing power 
parity (ppp). Takagi (1991) provides evidence from survey data that foreign exchange 
market participants accept ppp as a valid long-run relationship. This view has recently 
been supported by Taylor and Peel (2000) and Taylor et al. (2001), showing that, due to 
its nonlinear dynamics, the exchange rate reverts to the ppp level, but only in the long 
run. However, since the objective of this paper is to study the dynamics of deviations 
from any form of fundamental value we assume it to be exogenously given.  
Since fundamentalists are aware of traders with different forecasting techniques 
they will expect a slow mean reversion of the exchange rate. Another explanation for a 
smooth adjustment of the exchange rate to its long-run equilibrium value is proposed by 
Osler (1998). Speculators, submitting orders to exploit the current deviation of the 
exchange rate from its fundamental value, anticipate the impact of closing their position. 
If the exchange rate is actually perceived to be overvalued fundamentalists' current short 
position has to be closed by buying orders later, which, of course, drives the exchange 
                                                           
11 The conjectured asymmetry introduced by the nonlinear relationship between market maker's open 
position and the exchange rate clearly is only present in case of higher order Taylor expansion.  Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  14 
rate up to some extent. In this partial rational expectation framework, the mean reversion 
of the exchange rate is weaker the more speculators are in the foreign exchange market. 
In order to derive an excess demand function of fundamentalist speculation in 
either regime we continue to assume that the stochastic process of the market maker's 
position is perceived to exhibit some regularities, which means mean reversion for 
fundamentalist forecasting. In case of floating the perfect co-movement of exchange rates 
and inventory allows for a simple translation into an exchange rate based forecast. Due to 
the finite speed of adjustment, fundamentalists expect the exchange rate to be 
(13)  ,  () ) t ( s s ˆ ) t ( s s ˆ lr F
f
F − + = α
where  is the fundamentalists' long-run equilibrium value. The superscript f 




F s  is valid in case of floating. The development of 
the long-run equilibrium is concretized below for the Monte Carlo simulation. For the 
theoretical model, we leave it unspecified. Typical examples for processes describing 
fundamentals are constants or random walks as in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), or 
more general stationary ARMA processes.  
The fundamentalists’ excess demand is determined by 
(14)  ()( ) ˆˆ () () ()
ff
FF F F F l r x ts s t s s ββ α =− = − t . 
2.3.4 Fundamentalists’ trading rule in a target zone  
Within a target zone, however, a large expected change of market maker's 
inventory may lead only to a minor change of the exchange rate, which takes place 
particularly when the current exchange rate is near the edges of the band. The 
fundamentalists take the market maker’s calculation into account for their expectation of 
the exchange rate. As exchange rate and inventory do not perfectly correlate like in the 
free floating regime, they base their expectation on the expected order flow 
. The fundamentalists expect the order flow to show a tendency towards its  ) p ˆ ( s s ˆ F
TZ TZ
F =Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  15 
long-run equilibrium value   which describes the fundamentalists’ perception of the 
long-run equilibrium exchange rate, i.e. 
$
lr p
$ ( ) FF lr ˆ pp ( t ) pp ( t ) =+ α− . If the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate is in the center of the band, i.e.  lr s0 = $ , the fundamentalists 
expect a balanced inventory in the long run, i.e. $
lr p0 = . As long as the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate remains within the band ( ) , ss, so does the long-run 
equilibrium value  . We again expand the target zone exchange rate equation (4) in a 
Taylor series yielding 
lr p
(15)  .  $ ()
TZ
Fp F lr ˆ ss ( t ) s ' p p ( t ) =+ ⋅ α −
The excess demand of fundamentalists is well hump-shaped with respect to the 
current value of the exchange rate. 
(16)  () $ ( )
TZ
F F F FFp lr ˆ x (t) s s(t) s' p p(t) =β − =βα − , 
Aggregating the orders of chartist and fundamentalist yields the excess demand of 
speculators 
(17)  .  () ) t ( x ) t ( m 1 ) t ( x ) t ( m ) t ( x F C S − + =
In eq. (17) the variable m(t) is the weight assigned to chartist forecasts. If the 
exchange rate is at least weakly co-integrated with its fundamentals, then every 
misalignment must vanish in the long run. To motivate interaction between chartists and 
fundamentalists that result in globally stable exchange rate dynamics, we follow the 
modeling strategy introduced by De Grauwe et al. (1993). Assuming that there is 
uncertainty about the fundamental equilibrium of the exchange rate, fundamentalists’ 
expectations about its true value are symmetrically dispersed around the true value. The 
trading activity of the group of fundamentalists produces a zero excess demand when the 
exchange rate is at its fundamental value. The heterogeneity of beliefs diminishes when Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  16 
the exchange rate becomes increasingly over- or undervalued. Based on this behavioral 
approach to modeling the interaction between chartists and fundamentalist, we define  
(18)  2 ) t ( s 1
1
) t ( m
δ +
= . 
The dynamics of m(t) imply a small weight on fundamentalist forecasts in the 
neighborhood of the long-run equilibrium value, a "band of agnosticism" for 
fundamentalist speculation is suggested accordingly (De Grauwe et al., 1993). This is 
confirmed by Kilian and Taylor (2003) reporting a nonlinear mean reversion of the 
exchange rate with weak mean reversion for exchange rate values close to ppp and strong 
mean reversion for large misalignments. The coefficient δ is a measure of fundamentalist 
homogeneity. If, for instance, δ is small, then fundamentalists do not agree on the 
fundamental value of the exchange rate and their trading activity cancels out to a large 
degree. In contrast, for high values of δ, the dispersion of expectations around   is small 
implying a stronger impact on exchange rate as a group of speculators. 
lr s ˆ
 
2.4. Current account traders 
Besides speculators who submit orders on the basis of chartist and fundamentalist 
forecasts, there are so-called current account traders in the foreign exchange market. The 
current account traders submit orders reflecting cross border transactions such as exports 
and imports of goods and services and/or capital. Excess demand of current account 
traders is exposed to shocks to the underlying fundamentals so that the excess demand of 
current account traders may be described by  
( 1 9 )    () () CA CA x td t d zt σ = , Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  17 
where dz(t) is the increment of a standard Wiener process.
12 Current account traders are 
not assumed to speculate on foreign exchange markets as they are specialized in their 
exporting and importing business. As a result current account traders do not form 
exchange rate expectations implying that their trading behavior is not altered when 
introducing a target zone. 
 
3. Exchange Rate Dynamics 
In order to investigate whether or not a fully credible target zone is able to 
stabilize short-run exchange rates within our agent based setting we first provide some 
analytical results.  
 
3.1 Some Analytical Results 
3.1.1 Floating 
In the case of floating, we derive the following nonlinear stochastic first order 
differential equation for the exchange rate from the excess demand of speculators (17) 
and current account traders (19), and insert it into the price impact function (3): 
(20)  () ()
1( )















Due to the nonlinear weighing of speculators' market share the exchange rate may 
exhibit quite complex dynamics, but it is useful to consider first the two 'extreme' regimes 
that appear when either chartist or fundamentalist are providing exchange rate forecasts 
to speculators. If the exchange rate is currently close to the equilibrium value, then, 
according to (16), speculators exclusively adhere to chartist forecasting ( ), 
implying 
() 1 mt→
                                                           
12 In our model, current account traders are modeled as noise traders. Alternatively, we could model 
chartists and fundamentalists in a noisy fashion as in De Long et al. (1990) or Bauer and Herz (2005) and 
omit the current account traders from the model. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  18 
( 2 1 )  () () CA ds t dz t σ = . 
Eq. (21) represents a random walk. Randomly occurring deviations drive the 
exchange rate away from its fundamental value. When reaching the 'outer' regime more 
and more traders switch to fundamentalist forecasting, because the exchange rate 
becomes increasingly misaligned. In the limit speculative trading is only based on 
fundamentals, i.e. ( ) mt 0 = . Consequently, the exchange rate exhibits strong mean 
reversion and current misalignments are diminished over time: 
(22)  .  () ˆ () () () FF l r C A ds t s s t dt dz t βα σ −− =
Thereby, the exchange rate comes closer to the fundamental value and chartists 
regain popularity. This endogenous switching between chartist and fundamentalist 
trading should be capable of providing the empirical observed time series properties of 
floating exchange rates.  
3.1.2 Target Zone  
In the case of the target zone, we derive the following system of nonlinear 
stochastic first order differential equations for market maker's inventory and the exchange 
rate: 
(23)  ()   ()
1( ) '
() ()
1( ) ' 1( ) '
FF p CA
lr
CC p CC p
mt s
dp t p p t dt dz











dp t ds t
s
−= . 
In eq. (24), we made use of the fact that the price setting behavior of the market 
maker can be rewritten in form of derivatives, i.e.  ) t ( ' p ' s ) t ( ' s p⋅ = . The stability Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  19 
properties of the endogenous dynamics may be investigated to some extent analytically 
by calculating the non-trivial root of the characteristic equation:
13  













Starting by analyzing the inner regime of foreign exchange dynamics, defined by 
only minor exchange rate misalignments, we find that both m(t) and s’p are close to their 
maximum value, i.e.  ( ) 1 mt=  and  p s' 1 2 A = +ρ . In this case the properties of exchange 
rate dynamics are similar to those in free floating albeit the elasticity of the exchange rate 
on changes of the fundamentals is less than unity (honeymoon-effect). The only 
stabilizing force is provided by current account traders. When the exchange rate deviates 
from the central parity and reaches the outer regime, a decreasing value of s’p reduces the 
impact of speculators’ orders on the exchange rate.
14 In the limit, s’p = 0, implying that 
the exchange rate is prevented from going beyond the edges of the band. Of course, if the 
target zone should provide measurable stabilization, the formal band introduced by the 
monetary authorities has to be defined narrower than the informal band provided by 
fundamentalist speculation. As an endogenous source of stabilization, agents’ shifting 
from chartist to fundamentalist forecasts further enforces the adjustment process via a 
decreasing m(t). This effect on the exchange rate is even stronger when the target zone is 
able to anchor traders’ expectations so that the value of δ in eq. (18) increases. Although 
the analysis of the 'inner' and 'outer' regime provides useful first insights into our agent 
based model of the foreign exchange market, we now turn to a more rigorous Monte 
Carlo analysis.  
 
 
                                                           
13 We assume that the fundamentalists’ expectation of long run inventory remains constant  .    0 lr p ≡
14 Consequently, the exchange rate volatility will decrease as well. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  20 
3.2. Monte Carlo Analysis of the model 
We proceed with the following steps. First, it is important to derive the exchange 
rate dynamics of the benchmark floating exchange rate regime and assess whether the 
time series properties are replicated by the model. As the simulated time series of the 
model exhibit the main features such as persistent misalignments, fat tails, 
heteroskedasticity, and excessive volatility,
15 we may be convinced that the model 
replicates the main driving forces of the foreign exchange market. In a second step we 
then introduce the target zone and compare the derived time series properties with those 
of the benchmark floating exchange rate regime. We find, that the simulation replicates 
the typical features of exchange rates within a band, i.e. reduced volatility (disconnection 
of fundamental and nominal volatility), leptokurtosis, heteroskedasticity, persistent 
misalignments, and most important a hump-shaped distribution of the exchange rate 
within the band.
16 The heterogeneous agent setting implies mean reversion of the 
exchange rate without the need for a mean reverting fundamentals process. A sensitivity 
analysis concludes this section. 
3.2.1 Floating 
We simulate the development of the fundamental exchange rate and the shocks to 
the liquidity traders over 1000 periods and calculate the exchange rate according to 
equation (20). We then rerun the entire simulation 100,000 times to derive statistically 
significant conclusions on the applied statistics. The benchmark set of parameters for the 
simulation is  1 π = , 0.05 CA σ = , 0.9 C α = , 1 C β = , 0.01 F α = , 1 F β = , and  1 δ = . The 
fundamental exchange rate is simulated as a random walk,  , + f t i.e. ˆˆ 1 =− lr lr st st   () ( ) ε  
with standard deviation of the innovations  0.1 fund σ = . Figure 3 compares the 
                                                           
15 De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005a,b, 2006) provide a concise literature overview on the empirical 
characteristics of exchange rates. Their simulation studies also replicates these stylized facts. 
16 See Sarno and Taylor (2002) for a brief literature overview on the empirical properties of exchange rates 
in target zones. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  21 
fundamental to the nominal exchange rate for the first set of innovations to the 
fundamental exchange rate process and shocks to the liquidity traders.  
 
Figure 3: Simulated nominal (solid line) and fundamental (dots) exchange rate from the 
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The misalignment from t=750 on is clearly visible. While the fundamental rate 
deteriorates continuously, the liquidity traders and chartists stabilize the nominal 
exchange rate. Table 1 gives some statistics on the characteristics of the simulation 
studies with 100,000 runs. As the properties of the estimators’ distributions are unknown, 
we present the median and the interquartile range to indicate location and scale of the 
estimates.  
The nominal exchange rate process generated with our free float model replicates 
the stylized characteristics of empirical exchange rate data: excess volatility, 
leptokurtosis, volatility clustering, and persistent misalignments. Firstly, the nominal 
variance is twice the variance of the fundamentals showing excess volatility. Secondly, 
the median excess kurtosis of the simulated series is 11. Thirdly, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is rejected as for 99.7% of the simulated time series, the estimated 
ARCH coefficient in a GARCH(1,1) estimation is highly significant. Finally, the median 
of the misalignment periods within a run is 479, i.e. nearly half of the time the nominal 
exchange rate heavily deviates from the fundamentals. We define fundamental and 
nominal exchange rate to be misaligned if the difference is larger than 100 times the 
variance of the fundamentals’ innovations.
17
Table 3: Summary statistics for the floating scenario. 







Number of simulations 





Example time series  0.020  14  0  503 
Median from 100’ 





99,7%  479 
(426, 528) 
Note: The numbers in brackets give the first and third quartile of the statistics. 
 
3.2.1 Target Zone 
                                                           
17 That is 10 times the standard deviation. If the fundamentals are normally distributed, we should observe 
such a deviation only once in over a trillion years. 
18 The variance of the fundamentals 
2
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We now introduce the target zone regime according to equation (23) and (24) into 
the simulation. The symmetric target zone is normalized to an upper bound of 1, which is 
reached for an inventory of  2 p = , i.e. the width of the band equals twenty times the 
standard deviation of the fundamentals’ innovations.
19 All other parameters remain 
unchanged. 
Figure 4 illustrates the target zone regime under the identical set of innovations to 
the fundamental inventory process
20 and shocks to the liquidity traders which was used 
for the example in figure 3 and table 1. The top graph in figure 4 compares the 
fundamental to the nominal inventory. 
We again calculate the summary statistics for the benchmark example and the 
average of 100,000 simulations in table 2. In addition, we look at the first intervention 
time of the central bank.
21 The simulated target zone exchange rate process replicates the 
characteristics of real data series. It is less volatile, less leptokurtotic, and shows a lower 
degree of disconnection from the fundamentals than the free floating regime. The series 
are heteroskedastic and show a hump shaped distribution within the band. 
                                                           
19 That is even bigger than 100 times the variance. 
20 In the floating regime the inventory may be identified by the nominal exchange rate. 
21 If the central bank does not intervene in a run, this time is set to 1000. Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  24 
 
 
Figure 4: Simulated nominal (solid line) and fundamental (dots) inventory from the 
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The best known phenomenon of managed exchange rates is the reduction of the 
nominal exchange rate volatility. While in traditional economic models this volatility is 
transferred to other macroeconomic variables, empirical analyses reject this view. Flood 
and Rose (1995) analyze this volatility disconnect puzzle, i.e. real and nominal volatility 
are disconnected. They show in an extensive panel study that the nominal volatility of 
exchange rates declines for managing countries while the volatility of the fundamentals 
remains unchanged. More recent approaches using heterogeneous agents setups suggest 
theoretical explanations for multiple levels of nominal volatility for a given fundamental 
volatility. For example, the model of Jeanne and Rose (2002) shows multiple equilibria. 
They interpret the low volatility solution as a credible management regime and the high 
volatility solution as free float. In Bauer and Herz (2005), the nominal volatility depends 
on the credibility and degree of the central banks commitment to stabilize the exchange 
rate. A credible commitment prevents trend reinforcing herd effects. Trader’s build their 
expectations in the spirit of Krugman’s (1991) approach, i.e. with a certain proactive 
obedience, by incorporating the expected reaction of the exchange rate to central bank 
interventions. This creates self fulfilling expectations and de facto discharges the central 
bank from its obligation to actually intervene with the exception of very large exogenous 
shocks. If the central bank fails to communicate a credible commitment, technical trading 
reinforces nominal trends and thus either increases nominal volatility or frequently calls 
for interventions. 
Our model displays these stylized facts. While in the free floating regime, the 
nominal variance is excessively higher than the variance of the fundamental process, in 
the managed regime the converse holds true. The nominal volatility is disconnected from 
the fundamental volatility. For the same fundamental process and the – but for the 
traders’ expectation building – same model setup, the nominal variance is on average Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  26 
twice as high as the fundamental variance in the free floating regime and less than one 
third of the fundamental variance in the target zone regime.  
Another puzzle of exchange rates is the high frequency of large changes. The 
distributions of exchange rate returns deviates from the normal distribution by fat tails 
albeit the underlying fundamental don’t. Empirical findings like (e.g. De Vries (2001), 
Lux (1998), or Lux and Marchesi (2000)) document the leptokurtosis. The exchange rate 
processes simulated by our model show an average excess kurtosis of 11 in the free float 
and 2.5 in the target zone regime. The target zone value is less than for the floating 
regimes, but still indicates significantly heavy tailed distributions. 
Nominal exchange rates are also characterized by clustered volatilities which 
cannot be traced back to specific features of the fundamental or news process (see. e.g. 
Lux and Marchesi (2000), Andersen et al.(2001) or De Vries (2001)). Commonly these 
time series property is associated with ARCH and GARCH processes introduced by 
Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986). Our model replicates this feature, too. For 95% of 
the simulated time series the estimated ARCH coefficient in a GARCH(1,1) estimation is 
highly significant, while the fundamental process in each simulation is a random walk 
with normally distributed innovations. 
Another empirical observation is the “disconnect puzzle”, i.e. the exchange rate 
appears to be misaligned or disconnected from its underlying fundamentals (compare e.g. 
Meese and Rogoff (1983), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Lyons (2001)). Goodhart and 
Figluoli (1991) and Faust et al. (2002)) show that exchange rates move independently 
from news in the fundamentals. For our simulation, we call fundamental and nominal 
exchange rate to be misaligned if the difference is larger than 100 times the variance of 
the fundamentals’ innovations, i.e. half the width of the band. The median duration of the 
misalignment periods within a run in the target zone regime is 503 days. 
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Note: The numbers in brackets give the first and third quartile of the statistics. 
 
The most important empirical failure of the basic Krugman (1991) model, is its 
implication of a U-shaped distribution of the exchange rate within the band. The 
sensitivity of the nominal exchange rate with respect to movements of the fundamentals 
decreases with the deviation from the central parity. Thus for a random walk fundamental 
process, the model predicts the exchange rate to remain longer at the border of the band 
than in the interior. Empirical evidence strongly rejects the U-shaped distribution 
hypothesis. On the contrary, empirical studies (see e.g. Flood, Rose and Mathieson 
(1991), Bertola and Caballero (1992) or Lindberg and Söderlind (1994)) suggest a hump 
shaped distribution centered around the central parity. 
In the Krugman model, the exchange rate evolves directly from the fundamental 
process. Thus – even for extensions like Garber and Svenson (1995), who include 
intramarginal interventions, and Werner (1995), who endogenizes the probability of 
realignments, – only the assumption of a mean reverting fundamental process yields the 
type of hump-shaped distribution compatible with empirical results. 
Our approach with a heterogeneous trader structure overcomes this obstacle. 
Figure 5 shows a histogram of the exchange rate of the 100,000 runs. It displays the 
characteristic hump shape (see Sarno and Taylor 2002, pg. 184 ff.). Albeit the 
fundamental process is a random walk, the exchange rate process remains in the middle 
of the band longer than in the free floating model.  Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  28 
 
 
Figure 5: Histogram of the nominal exchange rate in the target zone model 
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3.2.3 Sensitivity analysis and potential extensions 
In this section, we relate the behavior of the simulations to different values of 
important parameters assumptions of the model. 
An increase of the variance of the fundamental process naturally increases the 
variability of the nominal exchange rate. In addition, the fundamental process leaves the 
area supporting the target zone faster, more likely and thus central bank interventions 
become more frequent and more intensive. Reducing this volatility source reverses these 
effects. In the border case of completely stable fundamentals  ˆ 0 lr s ≡ , the exchange rate 
remains within the interior of the band without central bank interventions. 
If the second source of exogenous shocks (the shocks to the liquidity traders) is 
intensified, i.e.  CA σ  increases, the exchange rate becomes more volatile within the band 
and the distribution of the exchange rate tends to a uniform distribution within the band. 
Applying a stationary AR(1) process to the fundamental generating process 
instead of a random walk reduces the variance and excess kurtosis of the simulated time 
series. The duration of misalignments as well as the necessity for central bank 
interventions decrease. 
3.2.4 Extensions 
Finally, we outline extensions of the model, which are subject to future research.  
Firstly, the extensions of Garber and Svenson (1995) – which includes 
intramarginal interventions into the Krugman model – and Werner (1995) – which 
endogenizes the probability of realignments – can be transferred straightforwardly into 
our heterogeneous agent setting. The incorporation of intramarginal interventions should 
strengthen the simulation results. An endogenous probability, i.e. an exchange rate close 
to the border of the band implies a high perceived probability for a realignment, should 
create a potential for self-fulfilling crises. A swing of the exchange rate might trigger a 
self-fulfilling credibility crises of the exchange rate. Thus comparisons of simulations Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach  30 
with and without endogenous realignment probability with the same set of stochastic 
shocks and under the same fundamental process, the self-fulfilling decrease of credibility 
can lead to a currency crisis which would not occur if the credibility remains exogenous. 
Secondly, we would like to better incorporate the effects of central bank 
interventions on the course of the fundamentals. At present, marginal interventions 
merely absorb the excess inventory necessary to keep the exchange rate within the band. 
Unsterilized interventions, however, might create some change in the drift of 
fundamentals. Furtherly, the magnitude of marginal interventions is typically arranged to 
induce a step into the interior of the band and we would like to adept this feature also. 
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